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This much abused bureau has . . . done more for the administration
of justice, for the maintenance of order, for the security of person,
liberty, and property, than an army costing tens of millions of
dollars. . . . To this tribunal the freedman has turned for protection,
for justice, for security.
Senator Henry Wilson (R.-Mass.), Feb. 1, 1866.1
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If it be asked whether the creation of such a tribunal within a State
is warranted as a measure of war, . . . [a]t present there is no part
of our country in which the authority of the United States is
disputed . . . . Undoubtedly the freedman should be protected, but
he should be protected by the civil authorities . . . . His condition
is not so exposed as may at first be imagined.
President Andrew Johnson, Veto Message, Second Freedmen’s
Bureau Act, Feb. 19, 1866.2
INTRODUCTION
As the horror of the Civil War drew to a close, leaving more than a
half-million dead3 in a population of only 30 million inhabitants, a
tremendous toll of physical and psychic devastation, a president
assassinated, and secession and slavery both defeated, a monster rampaged
through the South. Confederate General Wade Hampton, the scion of a
powerful South Carolina slaveholding family,4 conjured visions of a
grotesque and dreadful leviathan: “The war which was so prolific of
monstrosities, new theories of republican government, new versions of the
Constitution . . . gave birth to nothing which equals in deformity and
depravity this ‘Monstrum horrendum informe ingens.’”5 The Democratic
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
** Of Counsel, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP; Law Clerk to the Hon. Bernice B.
Donald, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 2017–18; J.D. cum
laude, The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law; Ph.D.,
History, and M.A., History, The Johns Hopkins University; M.A., History,
Columbia University; B.A., History, cum laude, University of Maryland, College
Park.
1. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3057 (1866).
2. Andrew Johnson, Veto Message, Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act (Feb.
19, 1866), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid
=71977 [https://perma.cc/7BXA-6PPR] (last visited July 11, 2018).
3. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR &
RECONSTRUCTION 487 (1992).
4. Wade Hampton II, S.C. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.scencyclopedia.org
/sce/entries/hampton-wade-ii/ [https://perma.cc/KBV7-W3U2] (last visited July
11, 2018).
5. James M. McPherson, Afterword, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU &
RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS 343, 344 (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M.
Miller eds., 1999). The Latin phrase, from the description of the monster
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Party made a central issue of attacking the “fabulous monster,” upon
which they looked “with a religious though insane horror.”6 Gideon
Welles, President Johnson’s staunchly anti-Reconstruction Secretary of
the Navy, spoke of it as an appalling “engine . . . a governmental
monstrosity.”7
What was this “monster” and why was it so widely hated? It was not
the occupying Union Army, nor the former slaves, now freedpeople, nor
even the Republican Party, but rather a federal government agency that
had been in existence for barely one year: the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, known as the Freedmen’s Bureau
(“Bureau”). George B. Shanklin, a Democratic Congressman from
Kentucky, strikingly expressed the singular place given to this entity as a
paramount symbol of evil for postwar White Southerners: advocating for
the prompt restoration of political rights to participants in the Confederate
cause,8 Shanklin envisioned the benefits of such a policy: “harmony and
prosperity [restored] . . . to a distracted country; the military removed to
the frontier and coast; and, above all, the Freedmen’s Bureau, the
manufacturer of paupers and vagabonds, the fruitful source of strife, vice
and crime, dispensed with, and an exhausted treasury relieved from the
burden of its support.”9

Polyphemus in the Aeneid, can be translated as “horrible, deformed, gigantic
monster.” DIG. LIBRARY, TUFTS U.: VIRGIL, AENEID, III.658, transl. Theodore C.
Williams, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02
.0054 [https://perma.cc/CJ7Z-DLF4] (last visited July 9, 2018).
6. John & LaWanda Cox, General O.O. Howard and the “Misrepresented
Bureau,” 19 J. S. HIST. 427, 445–46 (1953).
7. CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA: THE REVOLUTION AFTER
LINCOLN 101 (1957) (quoting GIDEON WELLES, DIARY, Vol. II 433 (1911)). In
this hugely influential—and highly readable—work, originally published in 1929,
Bowers painted the Reconstruction years in bleak tones as “the reign of the
carpetbagger,” id. at 540, in which “the Southern people literally were put to the
torture,” victims of “the despotic policies” of “daring and unscrupulous men . . . .
The evil that they did lives after them,” id. at ii. In addition to the language of
monstrosity, critics also painted the Bureau in satanic terms: White Southerners
were seen to view the Bureau as “a diabolical device for the perpetuation of the
national government’s control over the South, and for the humiliation of the
whites before their former slaves.” WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 33–34 (1907).
8. REPORT ON MEMPHIS RIOTS & MASSACRES, H.R. Rep. No. 101, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 41–43 (1866).
9. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
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Born out of the chaos of war, the Freedmen’s Bureau was a unique
entity created by Congress within the War Department shortly before
Lincoln’s death, Johnson’s assumption of the presidency, and the war’s
end.10 Congress charged the Bureau with assisting the freedmen in their
transition from slavery to free labor and, later, citizenship. The almost
inconceivably vast scope of its duties included emergency relief, education,
medical care, transportation, administering confiscated or abandoned lands,
implementing and overseeing a new system of agricultural labor contracts,
and more.11 The Bureau’s task has been characterized as nothing less than
“creating a new way of life for American Negroes, most of whom lived in
the South and had been slaves.”12 But, fashioning that “new way of life”
could not help but involve and affect White Southerners also, reshaping
the long-established, hierarchical relationships of domination they had
exercised over African-Americans. Whites, therefore, would have quite a
lot to say about the Bureau’s work.
Of the Bureau’s many fields of action, however, none stirred up as
much hostility as its judicial functions.13 W.E.B. DuBois, the pioneering
10. AVERY CRAVEN, RECONSTRUCTION: THE ENDING OF THE CIVIL WAR 57–
58 (1969).
11. One legal scholar has observed that the Bureau:
operate[d] in a wholly new frontier of American law. For the first time,
the federal government would operate directly in the personal lives of a
large body of citizens: it would review private contracts, settle labor and
property disputes, operate schools, and even serve as a licenser of
marriages. These activities were virtually, if not entirely, unknown
before—and some of them since—within what the Framers had called
the general government.
John M. Bickers, The Power to Do What Manifestly Must Be Done: Congress, the
Freedmen’s Bureau, and Constitutional Imagination, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 70, 87 (2006). For key works on the Bureau, see: W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE
ILLUSTRATED SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr. ed., Paradigm
Publishers 2005) (1903 as THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1903); PAUL S. PEIRCE, THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION (Haskell
House Publishers 1971) (1904); W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 1860-1880 (1935); GEORGE R. BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU (1955); WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, YANKEE STEPFATHER: GENERAL O.O.
HOWARD & THE FREEDMEN (1968); DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN
MOTION: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS 18651868 (1979); THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU & RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS
(Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999).
12. MCFEELY, supra note 11, at 20.
13. PATRICK W. RIDDLEBERGER, 1866: THE CRITICAL YEAR REVISITED 64
(1979).
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African-American sociologist and early historian of the Bureau, referred
to “administer[ing] justice between man and former master”14 as “[t]he
most perplexing and least successful” of the Bureau’s tasks.15
This Article explores the Freedmen’s Bureau as a significant part of
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment. It does so by
looking at the Bureau’s judicial powers, and their grant, exercise, and
political effects. The Article will proceed in four parts: Part I briefly
considers the Bureau’s wartime genesis. Part II, concerned mainly with
events in 1865, looks at the exercise of the Bureau’s judicial powers under
its original statute and the ongoing battles over jurisdiction. Part III,
concerning events mainly in 1866, explores the political fight over the
proposed Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, which led to a complete break
between Congressional Republicans and President Johnson. Part IV will
offer brief concluding thoughts, relating issues revealed in Parts II and III
to the broader question of the Bureau’s connection with the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I. WARTIME GENESIS OF THE BUREAU
Although a Congressional statute formally created the Freedmen’s
Bureau, in actuality, the agency arose out of the chaotic and violent reality
of the Civil War. Indeed, it is fair to say that African-American men,
women, and children created what would become the Freedmen’s Bureau
when they risked everything for freedom, seeking refuge from slavery
behind Union lines. This section addresses how escape from slavery
interacted with military necessity and politics to bring about the
establishment of the Bureau.

14. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 11, at 225.
15. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 49. Legal historians Harold M. Hyman
and William M. Wiecek capture the haphazard way Congress forced judicial
duties on the Bureau, as an outgrowth of wartime exigencies forcing “ill-prepared
military men” to shoulder tasks as humble as “fire prevention and sewage
disposal” but also “the resolution of complex civil relationships, including
criminal justice and commercial transfers.” HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–
1875 244 (1982).
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A. Forerunners
From its very beginning, a war purportedly unrelated to slavery16
inescapably brought the Union Army face-to-face with that institution and
the people in bondage to it: “[N]o sooner had the [Union] armies . . .
penetrated Virginia and Tennessee than fugitive slaves appeared within
their lines. They came at night, when the flickering camp-fires shone like
vast unsteady stars along the black horizon . . . a horde of starving
vagabonds, homeless, helpless, and pitiable.”17
Initially, Union Army officers ordered that slaves who had fled to their
lines be delivered to local authorities for return to their masters.18 General
Benjamin Butler, ironically a Democrat who had been against the war,
appears to have been the first to perceive the self-defeating nature of this
policy.19 In the case of three fugitive slaves, for example, whose owner
commanded a Virginia militia company, their return “would enhance the
strength of the enemy.”20 The Virginian sent an emissary who argued that
because the Union denied the right of secession, Butler could not withhold
the slaves’ return. Butler retorted, “But you say you have seceded, so you
cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these negroes as contraband

16. No such pretense existed on the Confederate side: Vice-President
Alexander H. Stephens proclaimed in his “Cornerstone Speech” at Savannah on
March 21, 1861: “Our new Government is founded . . . , its cornerstone rests,
upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery,
subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”
Cornerstone Speech, CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM. CONST., http://www.csa
constitution.com/p/alexander-h.html [https://perma.cc/78Y7-YS6J] (last visited
July 11, 2018). Meanwhile, Frederick Douglass tirelessly urged the Union to
make the conflict “an abolition war” for not only moral, but also strategic reasons.
Frederick Douglass, Cast Off the Mill-Stone, DOUGLASS’ MONTHLY (Sept. 1861),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/cast-off-themill-stone/ [https://perma.cc/NT7E-DE5W] (last visited July 11, 2018).
17. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 11, at 31. In fact, even
before soldiers shot the first shots at Ft. Sumter, “four slaves stole into Fort
Pickens, Florida . . . in the misapprehension that northern troops had been
stationed there to grant them freedom.” BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 1.
18. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 247; see also BENTLEY, supra note
11, at 1 (noting that the commanding officer of Ft. Pickens handed the four
fugitives over to the city marshal for return to their owners).
19. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 1; see also DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION,
supra note 11, at 63; MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 266.
20. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 1.
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of war.”21 The term caught on, and the “contrabands” policy was
entrenched as de facto Union Army policy, then incorporated into a law
signed by President Lincoln in August 1861.22 Secretary of War Cameron
wrote in late 1861 that the African-American fugitive slaves “constitute a
military resource, and being such, that they should not be turned over to
the enemy is too plain to discuss.”23 Butler’s innovation brought about the
close contact of many escaped slaves with operations of the Union Army,
planting the seed of what would become the Freedmen’s Bureau—and one
could not find a better example of history’s irony. It was all unplanned,
and apparently the furthest thing from President Lincoln’s mind, as he
dared not alarm slaveholders in non-seceding border states like Missouri
and Kentucky by adhering to a policy of welcoming escaped slaves.24
As the war went on, the scattered appearance of fugitive slaves finding
their way into Union lines became a flood.25 This influx posed both a
humanitarian and military challenge, as large numbers of freedmen
bringing up their rear or massed on the fringes of military camps affected
army units’ mobility and resources.26
To meet these challenges, military leaders improvised an array of
solutions, or what DuBois referred to as a series of “strange little
governments” or “experiments.”27 The most famous of these “rehearsals
for Reconstruction”28 occurred on the South Carolina Sea Islands
beginning with the United States Navy’s occupation of Port Royal in
November 1861, when planters abandoned their lands en masse.29 The
10,000 remaining slaves drew on a long tradition of organizing their own
labor, and began organizing under the supervision of Northern
21. Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).
22. MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 266.
23. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 33.
24. MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 161–62. When the embattled General John
Frémont attempted to turn around his dire position in Missouri by decreeing, in
August 1861, the emancipation of slaves belonging to Confederate sympathizers,
the order “stirred up a hornet’s nest.” Id. Lincoln forced Frémont to backtrack on
the measure, and for this and other reasons, relieved him of his command soon
thereafter. Id.
25. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 37.
26. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863–1877 57 (1988); DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 37.
27. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 36–37, 40–41.
28. See WILLIE LEE ROSE, REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: THE PORT
ROYAL EXPERIMENT (1964).
29. FONER, supra note 26, at 51.
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missionaries, teachers, and other reformers.30 The “Port Royal
experiment” received military recognition late in the war, in the form of
General William Tecumseh Sherman’s Field Order No. 15 “reserv[ing] for
the settlement of the negroes made free by the acts of the war”—including
Lincoln’s 1863 Emancipation Proclamation—“[t]he islands from
Charleston, south, the abandoned rice fields along the rivers for thirty
miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. Johns river,
Florida.”31 Other “experiments” included General Lorenzo Thomas’s plan
to lease plantations along the Mississippi to loyal Northerners, who would
then hire freedmen as laborers under Army-imposed rules.32 In overseeing
African-American labor, however, the Army maintained many of the
similar customs of the old system, including strict discipline and
punishment of vagrancy.33
The Army’s handling of freedmen’s labor highlighted a fundamental
tension and uncertainty that would persist after the war’s end. The single
most far-reaching outcome of the Civil War was to end a legal regime that
enabled some human beings to hold others as property—chattel slavery.34
That much was known, but little more. The end of slavery “raised as many
questions as it answered.”35 As a northern traveler pithily remarked, the
country stood poised between a “great contest of arms just closed, and . . .
[a] still greater contest of principles not yet terminated.”36 The questions at
the heart of Reconstruction—involving the status of the former Confederate
states and their new relation to the Union—“raised constitutional problems
of almost metaphysical subtlety.”37 But the “greater contest of principles”
30. Id. at 51–54.
31. Special Field Orders, No. 15 (Jan. 16, 1865), FREEDMEN & SOUTHERN
SOC’Y PROJECT, http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/sfo15.htm [https://perma.cc/EZ
2M-K7 92] (last visited July 11, 2018); OLIVER OTIS HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
II, 191 (1908).
32. FONER, supra note 26, at 57. Thomas M. Conway devised another system,
as he was “in charge of some 90,000 Negroes, 50,000 of whom lived on 1,500 farms
managed by Conway’s Bureau of Free Labor” during the last year of the war.
BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 57.
33. FONER, supra note 26, at 58–59.
34. Id. at 1–7, 11.
35. Id. at 35.
36. JOHN T. TROWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-FIELDS AND
RUINED CITIES iii (1866).
37. Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Professionalism During the
Civil War & Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2076 (2005)
(quoting DAVID DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1867 55–56
(1965)).
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was the transformation of slaves into freedmen, and freedmen into citizens,
raising problems of overwhelming difficulty. The Freedmen’s Bureau
would be forced to confront them.
B. Creation of the Bureau
Shortly after the Emancipation Proclamation, Representative Thomas
Eliot, Republican of Massachusetts, proposed the creation of a Bureau of
Emancipation, but the bill did not progress.38 Subsequently, in June 1864,
a committee of inquiry, which Secretary of War Stanton empaneled,
endorsed the idea of a “temporary bureau for the ‘improvement,
protection, and employment of refugee freedmen.’”39
Where in the federal government that “temporary bureau” would be
located became a point of contention. When Eliot first proposed such a
measure, Congress favored the Treasury Department because, in part, its
control of abandoned lands in the South seemed a logical fit with
assistance to the freedmen.40 Sumner, the Senate sponsor of the later bill,
also favored the Treasury Department.41 In the end, however, the
successful legislation placed the agency within the War Department.42
This placement had important consequences for the Bureau, both positive
and negative. The principal logic behind the choice appears to have been
fiscal and pragmatic, as Congress appropriated virtually no funds for the
Bureau, but allowed it to take advantage of the ready-made scaffolding the
military offered—in effect “coloniz[ing]” the Union Army’s “resources,
personnel, and discipline.”43
The First Freedmen’s Bureau Act (“First Bureau Act”), which
Congress enacted on March 3, 1865, was both vague and broad in its grant
of authority. Its enacting clause began:
That there is hereby established in the War Department, to
continue during the present war of rebellion, and for one year
thereafter, a bureau of refugees, freedmen, and abandoned lands,
to which shall be committed, as hereinafter provided, the
supervision and management of all abandoned lands, and the
38. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 40; BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 20.
39. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 37–38.
40. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 39–43.
41. Id. at 40–41.
42. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at xiv.
43. Robert C. Lieberman, The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Politics of
Institutional Structure, 18 SOC. SCI. HIST. 405, 434 (1994) (citations omitted).
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control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel
states, or from any district or county within the territory embraced
in the operations of the army, under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the head of the bureau and approved by the
President.44
The ill-defined, impossibly vast scope of its charge—the “all subjects
relating to” language—was not the only difficulty surrounding the
Bureau’s birth; the chronological sweep of events posed its own
challenges. In early March 1865, when the First Bureau Act became law,
the end was clearly near for the Confederacy—Charleston had surrendered
just two weeks earlier,45 and the Confederate government was desperate
enough to seriously consider enlistment of African-Americans as
soldiers.46 The First Bureau Act’s “sunset provision,”47 therefore, meant
that the clock was ticking loudly on the Bureau from the very beginning.
Moreover, the scale of the agency was hardly proportionate to its
responsibilities. The Bureau’s basic structure was simple. At the top was
its commissioner, a position filled by General Howard throughout the
Bureau’s existence.48 Below the commissioner were the assistant
commissioners, generally one per state.49 The commissioner and assistant
commissioners were the only Bureau personnel to receive separate
salaries; other than those positions, Congress provided for no salaries
“other than regular Army pay.”50 The Bureau was not merely simple in
structure—it was also thinly staffed; for all the Republican commitment
to the freedmen and to the transformation of the former Confederate states,
those legislators seemed to want “Reconstruction-on-the-cheap.”51 With

44. FIRST FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ACT, reprinted in THE AMERICAN NATION:
PRIMARY SOURCES 91–92 (Bruce P. Frohnen ed., 2008).
45. MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 471–73.
46. Id. at 477–78.
47. “[T]here is hereby established in the War Department, to continue during
the present war of rebellion, and for one year thereafter, a bureau of refugees,
freedmen, and abandoned lands . . . .” FIRST FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ACT, reprinted
in THE AMERICAN NATION, supra note 44, at 91 (emphasis added).
48. MCFEELY, supra note 11, at 4.
49. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 215.
50. MCFEELY, supra note 11, at 65.
51. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 444; see also NIEMAN, supra note
11, at 3–4.
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some 550 agents—plus some 350 clerks—for the entire South at its peak,
the Bureau had faint hope of fulfilling its vast mission.52
The Bureau presence was mostly limited to state capitals and the
principal county seats.53 Absent special circumstances, agency personnel
would rarely visit, much less police, the smaller, rural communities, and it
was in such communities where most of the South’s population lived.54
One freedman’s harrowing account underscored the remoteness of the
Bureau: he trekked 60 miles on foot to the nearest Bureau agent to lodge
a complaint against a planter, only to be captured en route by a group of
armed white men.55
Bureau agents, functioning locally at the county level, were crucial
figures. Commissioner Howard and the assistant commissioners may have
articulated policy and issued orders, but the agents were the key players in
day-to-day implementation, and were the face of the Bureau to local
Whites and African-Americans alike. Howard referred to the local agents
with awe and empathy as “a magistrate with extraordinary judicial
power—overseer of the poor of all classes in his district, agent to take care
of abandoned lands, and required to settle, in a few days, the most intricate
questions with reference to labor, political economy, &c, that have puzzled
the world for ages.”56
Assignments also far outnumbered the agents, with one agent typically
assigned to one, two, or three counties and tens of thousands of
freedpeople, often unaided and with a hostile White population
surrounding the assignment.57 A South Carolina agent recalled, “Consider
the absurdity of expecting one man to patrol three thousand miles and
make personal visitations to thirty thousand Negroes.”58 It was the
comparatively rare agent fortunate enough to “ha[ve] a horse and a clerk

52. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 444; see also NIEMAN, supra note 11,
at 11–15.
53. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 444; NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 11–15.
54. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 444.
55. Affidavit of Edward Smith (July 30, 1866), Documents from Freedom: A
Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, FREEDMEN & SOUTHERN
SOC’Y PROJECT, http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/ESmith.html [https://perma.cc
/HBK7-LNSF] (last visited July 11, 2018).
56. DUNNING, supra note 7, at 30.
57. MARY FARMER-KAISER, FREEDWOMEN & THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU:
RACE, GENDER & PUBLIC POLICY IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 20 (2010).
58. Id. at 20–21.
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to help with the responsibilities of office,” and even rarer to have Union
troops nearby for protection and assistance with enforcement or arrests.59
W.E.B. DuBois’s “sociological imagination”60 captured the difficult
context facing the freedmen and the Bureau charged with aiding them:
“Here at a stroke of the pen was erected a government of millions of men”
and women emerging from centuries under a “peculiarly complete system
of slavery” and who “now, suddenly, violently, . . . come into a new
birthright, at a time of war and passion, in the midst of the stricken,
embittered population of their former masters.”61 DuBois’s observation is
of paramount importance, placing in stark relief the complex, highly
charged feeling-state of White Southerners at the time the freedmen were
beginning to assert their rights as free men and women, and as citizens of
the United States.
For all the antipathy of White Southerners towards the Bureau and its
agents, it should be noted that some agents did not exactly keep a
professional distance from White Southern society. General Clinton B.
Fisk, assistant commissioner for Tennessee, complained that Washington
imposed upon him agents not of his choosing, and that some proved not
only prejudiced against African-Americans, but also easy prey to the
flattery of a planter’s dinner invitation and the “attentions and smiles of
his fair daughters.”62 To the extent that Bureau agents adopted such
attitudes, they may have exemplified a fascination among many White
Northerners for the mythology of the Southern planter elite.63

59. Id. at 20.
60. Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., Introduction: Courage & the Sociological
Imagination: W.E.B. DuBois’s The Souls of Black Folk, in DUBOIS, SOULS, supra
note 11, at xiii.
61. DUBOIS, SOULS, supra note 11, at 40.
62. TROWBRIDGE, supra note 36, at 338. But see DAN T. CARTER, WHEN THE
WAR WAS OVER: THE FAILURE OF SELF-RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH, 18651867 214 (1985) (cautioning against reading too much into Bureau officials’
“acceptance of invitations to deer hunts and plantation dinners”).
63. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 11, at 35 (1935) (noting that
many Northerners “abased” themselves and “flattered and fawned” over the planter
elite, with its “leisure for good breeding and high living”). DuBois observed
caustically that many elite planters were just a generation or two removed from
origins as humble as those of immigrant-stock Northerners, but that these latter,
“hardworking, upwardly mobile . . . folk,” were the sort who “not only ‘love a lord,’
but even the fair imitation of one.” Id. at 34–35.
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II. THE BUREAU’S ORIGINAL JUDICIAL POWERS
As with the creation of the agency itself, the Bureau’s judicial
functions arose under the exigencies of the war and its aftermath. This
section examines the improvised nature of this aspect of the Bureau’s
work, its ill-defined statutory basis, and its shifting fortunes under the First
Bureau Act.
A. Judicial Powers Under the First Freedmen’s Bureau Act
The First Bureau Act did not grant the agency express judicial authority,
but the authority was inferred from the broad “all subjects relating to . . .
freedmen” language.64 From the beginning, however, disputes over the labor
contracts the Bureau oversaw demanded immediate attention.65 Amidst the
postwar crisis of Southern agriculture, these disputes between freedmen and
planters formed the core of the agency’s early judicial docket.66
Just two weeks after assuming his post as Commissioner of the Bureau,
Howard issued an order requiring his assistant commissioners to adjudicate
difficulties where at least one party was African-American.67 This document,
Circular No. 5, became the first operational expression of the Bureau’s
judicial functions. The circular provided, in relevant part:
In all places where there is an interruption of civil law, or in which
local courts, by reason of old codes, in violation of the freedom
guaranteed by the proclamation of the President and laws of
Congress, disregard the negro’s right to justice before the laws in
not allowing him to give testimony, the control of all subjects
relating to refugees and freedmen being committed to this bureau,
the Assistant Commissioners will adjudicate, either themselves or
through officers of their appointment, all difficulties arising
between negroes themselves, or between negroes and whites or
Indians, except those in military service, so far as recognizable by
military authority, and not taken cognizance of by the other

64. FIRST FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ACT (1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 91–92.
65. See HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 251.
66. See id. As Howard saw it, the Bureau had to find a way to successfully
adjudicate these labor-contract disputes, or the South would face the real
possibility of “race wars” and “starvation.” See id.
67. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 152.
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tribunals, civil or military, of the United States.68
The circular thus set up two triggers for Bureau jurisdiction: either (1)
“where there is an interruption of civil law”; or (2) where “local courts, by
reason of old codes, in violation of the freedom guaranteed by the
proclamation of the President and laws of Congress, disregard negro’s
right of justice before the laws in not allowing him to give testimony.”69
This rule was in some senses a quite narrow jurisdictional assertion, for
African-Americans’ “right to justice before the laws” could be
“disregard[ed]” in other ways than simply excluding their testimony.70 The
phrase “disregard the negro’s right to justice,” contained at least the seed
of a larger assertion of Bureau jurisdiction and imposition of a higher
requirement of the state courts. For the moment, however, the Bureau’s
focus was on the admissibility of African-Americans’ testimony in state
courts.71
Undoubtedly, the right of an African-American to give testimony did
not always translate into being effectively heard. A Freedmen’s Bureau
agent in Virginia reported on a trial of a white defendant accused of horse
theft in the County Court, where:
[O]n the first day the Court refused to admit Negro testimony,
though the case clearly comes under the statute admitting such
testimony; on the second day [defense] Counsel again attempted to
introduce Negro testimony and pressed the matter so strongly that
the Court admitted it but I am satisfied placed no weight upon it.72

68. Freedmen’s Bureau, Circular No. 5, § VII, in REP. OF COMM’R OF
BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (Dec. 1, 1865).
69. Id. (emphasis added). The circular’s use of the preposition “in” is telling,
as it virtually equates the denial of justice with the prohibition on AfricanAmerican testimony. See id.
70. Id.
71. Typical of the Bureau’s focus on this issue was the first act of Brigadier
General Davis Tillson on arriving in Memphis in July 1865 to establish the
Bureau’s Memphis subdistrict. STEPHEN V. ASH, A MASSACRE IN MEMPHIS: THE
RACE RIOT THAT SHOOK THE NATION ONE YEAR AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 22
(2013). Tillson met with the city’s mayor to find out whether local courts accepted
African-American testimony on learning that Tennessee law forbade it, he set up
a Freedman’s Court in the city. Id.
72. Lt. Hiram Hunt to Bvt. Brig. Gen. O. Brown (Sept. 30, 1866), Records of
the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Virginia, FREEDMEN’S BUREAU
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Nevertheless, although the admission of African-Americans’
testimony hardly exhausted all of the rights to which the freedmen,
seconded by their Republican allies, were entitled, it was not exactly a
trivial right. Noah Swayne, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
illustrated its importance by noting that “where a white man was sued by
a colored man, or was prosecuted for a crime against a colored man,
colored witnesses were excluded. This in many cases involved a denial of
justice. Crimes of the deepest dye were committed by white men with
impunity.”73
Tellingly, the language of Circular No. 5 framed the acceptance or
refusal of African-American testimony. Indeed, Howard consistently
painted the testimony issue as vital: “The work of my officers in obtaining
recognition of the negro as a man instead of a chattel before the civil and
criminal courts took the lead; we took the initiative in influencing the
South in its transition into the new order of things.”74 Although the
Bureau’s attention was focused on instituting contractually based labor
arrangements to stabilize postwar agriculture, Howard saw the Bureau’s
judicial efforts as representing “the first active endeavor to put the colored
man or woman on a permanent basis on a higher plane.”75
Several Southern states actively resisted the requirement of AfricanAmerican testimony, even though relenting on that issue would have
allowed them to avoid Bureau jurisdiction.76 President Johnson, realizing
the cost of a hard line on this issue in the Southern states, pressured the
states to relent.77 In Mississippi, for instance, Johnson was successful, as
the legislature revised its ban on African-American testimony by allowing
it in cases where at least one party was African-American.78
Howard’s recollection of the beginnings of the Bureau’s judicial
activity highlights the improvised quality of the procedures that were
developed, as well as the general’s naïve faith in good will and
reasonableness. Howard described meeting with a group of planters near
Charlottesville, Virginia, some of whom expressed confusion or
ONLINE, http://www.freedmensbureau.com/virginia/crimcases5.htm [https://per
ma.cc/6T3H-MHLJ] (last visited July 11, 2018) (emphasis added).
73. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 787 (Cir. Ct., D. Ky. 1866).
74. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 251.
75. Id.
76. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 72–74.
77. Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant & the Freedmen’s Bureau, in THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS (Paul Alan
Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999); see also NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 73.
78. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 74.
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hopelessness at the prospect of obtaining freedmens’ labor.79 Others asked
what would prevent laborers from simply leaving a crop unharvested, or
puzzled over how to make contracts with freedmen.80 Howard recounted
how, after hearing planters’ concerns, he addressed them:
“Gentlemen, no one of us alone is responsible for emancipation.
The negro is free. This is a fact. Now cannot we blue-eyed AngloSaxons devise some method by which we can live with him as a
free man?” I then made a suggestion. “Suppose for all minor cases,
say within one or two hundred dollars of value, we organize a
court. My agent being one member may represent the
Government; the planters of a district can elect another, and the
freedmen a third. In nine cases out of ten the freedmen will choose
an intelligent white man who has always seemed to be their friend.
Thus in our court so constituted, every interest will be fairly
represented.”81
Howard reported that the planters, “pleased” and “astonished to find
[him] a friend and not an enemy, . . . said with feeling: ‘General, why
didn’t you come down here before?’”82
Shortly thereafter, three-judge courts on this model were initiated in
that locale and throughout Virginia; the tribunals were made up largely of
Bureau officers or agents, but tribunals also incorporated civilians onto the
courts.83 These tribunals, often known as “Freedmen’s Courts,” heard
relatively minor matters, civil and criminal, with “the power as to
punishment . . . limited to not exceed $100 fine, or thirty days’
imprisonment.”84 Tribunals referred capital crimes, other felonies, and
79. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 251–52; see also James Oakes, A Failure
of Vision, 25 CIVIL WAR HIST. 66, 68–69 (1979) (noting a political candidate’s
urging the acceptance of African-American testimony lest “the military courts and
Freedmen’s Bureau take [such testimony], and jurisdiction is lost”).
80. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 252.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Astonishing as it may seem, one of the Freedmen’s Court judges in
Virginia was none other than pro-slavery ideologue George Fitzhugh. Fitzhugh
was famous for his Antebellum writings extolling plantation slavery as a positive
good and condemning what he saw as the coldly commercial coercion of Northern
industrial society. See GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH: OR THE
FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY (1854); GEORGE FITZHUGH, SLAVES WITHOUT
MASTERS (1857).
84. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 252.
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property disputes to state courts if in operation, or to a federal court or
military commission.85
As with the various relief and labor experiments which gave rise to the
Freedmen’s Bureau, so the exercise of the Bureau’s judicial powers was
subject to ad hoc arrangements differing from state to state. One of the
more notable special arrangements occurred in Alabama, which used
single-judge courts. The initiative came from General Wager Swayne,
assistant commissioner for Alabama.86 General Swayne approached the
provisional governor of Alabama with an offer: the Bureau would allow
civilian magistrates to act as Bureau judges, provided the magistrates
allowed African-American testimony. The condition was significant, and
meant the arrangement was not the same as giving jurisdiction over
African-Americans’ cases to the civil courts—Alabama law barred state
courts from admitting such testimony.87
The Governor encouraged magistrates to accept appointments under
Swayne’s terms, noting:
[T]he alternative was having courts composed of strangers, with
no recognized rules of procedure, and without appeal. Very soon
Swayne was able to report that acceptances of Bureau judgeships
were coming in “as fast as the mails permit.” And he had no
difficulty getting his particular kind of Bureau courts established
throughout Alabama.88
Howard approved the arrangement, “believing it to be necessary to test the
civil judges as to their disposition to do justice to the freedman.”89 In
December 1865, the Bureau reported to Congress that “[f]avorable reports
have come from nearly every quarter of [Alabama],” though noting reports
of “grave abuses” from the northern part of the state.90 Unfortunately,
experience would show that “grave abuses” were more than isolated
exceptions, and that circumstances hardly warranted the Bureau’s stepping
aside in deference to state justice.

85. Id. at II, 252–53.
86. The general’s father was United States Supreme Court Justice Noah
Swayne. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 153–54.
88. Id.
89. REP. OF COMM’R OF BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(Dec. 1, 1865).
90. Id.
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B. Cession and Reassertion of Jurisdiction
In the summer and early fall of 1865, Bureau policy pointed towards
deferring to the jurisdiction of state courts.91 The key reason seemed to be
the willingness of those state tribunals to allow African-American
testimony.92 Abolitionist Wendell Phillips faulted Howard for so readily
ceding jurisdiction and thus “put[ting] the freedmen into the jaws of the
tiger,” to which Howard responded that “secur[ing] the negro’s testimony
in the Southern courts” was “a long step gained” and that “[j]ustice in time
w[ould] work itself clear.”93
Even in Texas, a state marked by exceptional violence towards
freedmen and hostility to the Bureau, Howard urged the assistant
commissioner to “promote mutual good will among blacks and whites, by
a spirit of fairness.”94 The Bureau seized on even modest successes, such
as the case of a white man convicted for killing a Negro in Mississippi and
sentenced to a year’s imprisonment.95 The assistant commissioner reported
to Howard that although it was “perhaps more than probable that the
punishment awarded in this case was inadequate,” there was reason to:
trust[] that the conviction in this case wholly on negro testimony
and the excellent sentiments promulgated by Judge Campbell will
be the good seed which will germinate at no distant day into the
full fruition of perfect protection of the civil rights of the negro by
the civil tribunals of this state.96
As the fall of 1865 wore on, though, Howard grew uneasy with the
cession of jurisdiction to state courts. When particularly egregious cases
of injustice towards freedmen occurred in a state or part of a state, the
Bureau “sporadically exercised its right to reestablish its judicial authority
over whites as well as blacks.”97 This shift of authority might have
involved removal of a particular case from a state court, or the wholesale
reassertion of Bureau jurisdiction and the reopening of Bureau courts.
Most commonly, however, assistant commissioners relied on provost91. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 103–04.
92. Id.; see also HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 253–55.
93. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 254.
94. Cox & Cox, supra note 6, at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 455–56 (citing Gen. T.J. Wood to Gen. Howard, Sept. 27, 1866).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Oakes, supra note 79, at 72–73 (quoting REP. OF COMM’R OF BRF&AL,
H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (Dec. 1, 1865)).
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marshal courts to handle cases referred by Bureau agents.98 Agents
reported such conditions, for instance, in Arkansas and Virginia; Bureau
courts were reopened in three counties of the latter state.99
In most cases in which an assistant commissioner authorized such
intervention, however, the commissioner relied on the provost courts to
handle all cases that local agents referred. As provost courts were more
accessible to freedmen, accepted black testimony, and eliminated many of
the institutional barriers which prevented blacks from even getting into a
civil court, they were often the only ready source of justice upon which
freedmen could rely.100 Even Howard had his reservations about them,
however, noting that some provost-court officers, “having the infectious
prejudice against the negro, have discriminated very much against his
interest, and meted out . . . punishments in no way commensurate with the
offenses.”101
In Alabama, assistant commissioner Swayne’s initial optimism gave
way to bitter disappointment, as he “found the Alabama legislators
anything but fair and just. He said: ‘The vagrant law of Alabama operates
most iniquitously upon the freedmen. In terms, the law makes no
distinction on account of color, but in practice the distinction is invariable.
. . .’”102 In the end, Swayne became aware of so many grievances against
the Bureau courts staffed by state magistrates that he was forced to reopen
regular Bureau courts in a number of places.103 In some places, Howard
reported that restoring Bureau courts was necessary “to prevent open
revolt by negroes against evident legal persecution in State courts.”104
As it became clear that Southern state governments were according
African-Americans merely the “bare forms” of due process, assistant
commissioners began to reassert Bureau jurisdiction.105 For instance, the
assistant commissioner for Texas ordered local agents to try cases in which
freedmen had been denied justice, stating that he was “powerless to get
Justice” for them in Texas state courts.106 In September 1866, Howard

98. Id.
99. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 286–87.
100. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 9–11.
101. Oakes, supra note 79, at 72–73 (quoting REP. OF COMM’R OF BRF&AL,
H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 1, 1865) at 22).
102. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II 251–56.
103. Id. at II, 287.
104. Id. at II, 251–56.
105. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 158.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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issued orders directing local agents in operating Bureau courts “should you
now have any, or have occasion under the law to re[e]stablish them.”107
As the first partial year of Bureau operations drew to a close, the
uncertainty of the agency’s future loomed for both the agency and the
freedmen it served. Howard told Congress that “[t]he government has set
the slaves free and bound itself to make that freedom an undisputed fact,”
and reported that African-Americans “of any considerable intelligence
pleaded earnestly for the continuance of the bureau, as [their] only hope
of justice.”108 He argued for the necessity of the Bureau until “the hostility
against the government shall have more completely subsided, till free labor
shall have become more palatable, and till the rights of negroes to full
protection by the laws become more generally believed in than now
appears.”109 Howard also noted that the agency’s work had been “much
hampered by the instructions of the President himself, who had now
gradually drifted into positive opposition to the Bureau law—a law that he
was bound by his oath of office to execute.”110
III. THE BATTLE OVER THE SECOND FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ACT
Against the backdrop of growing presidential opposition to the
Bureau, the agency’s direct experience of the difficulties freedmen faced
in Southern courts, and the imminent expiration of the First Bureau Act,
Congressional Republicans moved late in 1865 to place the Bureau on a
more secure footing.111 This section examines the hostile terrain on which
the Bureau operated, both with the White House and in Southern
courthouses and state houses, tracing the main lines of the battle for a
Second Bureau Act.
A. Challenges to the Bureau’s Judicial Powers
Through late 1865 and early 1866, the Bureau faced many grave
problems relating to the exercise of its judicial functions. One major
difficulty was the enactment of overtly discriminatory legislation towards
freedmen in Southern states—the so-called “Black Codes”—Southern
state legislative measures enacted beginning in late 1865 to control
107. Id. at 159.
108. REP. OF COMM’R OF BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 33
(Dec. 1, 1865).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 280.
111. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 106–15.
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freedmen.112 Mississippi and South Carolina were the first states to
implement Black Codes; not coincidentally, the two states with the largest
African-American populations, in fact unique in the United States in
having African-American majorities.113
General Wood, Mississippi’s assistant commissioner, reported that
“[s]everal of the statute laws of this State in reference to the negroes are
very objectionable,” and went on to enumerate examples.114 Wood termed
“unjust, oppressive, and unconstitutional” Mississippi statutes prohibiting
African-Americans from bearing arms without a special license,
prohibiting African-Americans from buying or leasing real property
except in incorporated towns or cities, and requiring all AfricanAmericans to enter into a labor contract by the 10th of January of each
year.115 Wood even pointed disapprovingly to “[t]he statute that makes the
negro a competent witness in all cases in which one or both of the parties
are negroes,” reasoning that “[s]ince the negro is a competent witness . . .
in cases in which a white person is either plaintiff or defendant and the
other party a negro, no reason can be perceived why the colored person
should not be a competent witness when both parties are white persons.”116
Perhaps a greater problem from the Bureau’s standpoint was
legislation in other states that did not overtly discriminate, but that had a
discriminatory intent or that courts applied unequally to Whites and to
African-Americans. After the contentious rollout of Mississippi’s and
South Carolina’s codes, subsequent statutes in other states tended to
“ma[k]e no reference to race, to avoid the appearance of discrimination
and comply with the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866. But it was well
understood, as Alabama planter and Democratic politico John W. DuBois
112. Id. at 72–73.
113. FONER, supra note 26, at 199–200. According to the 1870 Census, South
Carolina’s African-American population was 415,814, representing 58.9% of the
total population of 705,606; the corresponding figure for Mississippi was 444,201,
or 53.6% of a total population of 827,992. Calculated from Ninth Census–Volume
I. THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 5 (1872). In
large part because of these demographics, the White elites of both states had
historically shown the greatest anxiety about controlling their African-American
populations. Regarding planter attitudes in South Carolina, see PETER H. WOOD,
BLACK MAJORITY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670
THROUGH THE STONO REBELLION (1974).
114. ANNUAL REP. OF THE SEC’Y OF WAR 56 (1866) (Report of Gen. T.J. Wood).
115. Id.
116. Id. Wood asserted that the law actually harmed Whites more than
African-Americans. Id.
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later remarked, that ‘the vagrant contemplated was the plantation
negro.’”117 Textual equality concealing practical inequality was not always
lost on Bureau officials, as when General Swayne noted how Alabama’s
nominally nondiscriminatory “vagrant law . . . operat[ed] most
iniquitously upon the freedmen.”118 Legislators enacted laws regarding
debtors, laborers, and loiterers in many states, and courts chiefly—or
exclusively—enforced them against African-Americans.119
Discriminatory legislation could sometimes pale in the face of other
difficulties. For the Bureau, one of the most serious was the constant
threat, and frequent reality, of arrest and even prosecution of agents for
acts carried out pursuant to their official duty.120 The Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, reported in the
Spring of 1866:
[O]fficers of the Union army on duty, and northern men who go
south to engage in business, are generally detested and proscribed.
Southern men who adhered to the Union are bitterly hated and
relentlessly persecuted. In some localities prosecutions have been
instituted in State courts against Union officers for acts done in
the line of official duty, and similar prosecutions are threatened
elsewhere as soon as the United States troops are removed. All
such demonstrations show a state of feeling against which it is
unmistakably necessary to guard.121
In Florida, General J.G. Foster reported that Tallahassee police,
emboldened by the President’s growing hostility to the Bureau, were
arresting Freedmen’s Bureau and Army officers “for trifling causes.”122
Criminal and civil prosecutions were one way of deploying state legal
machinery against the Bureau—and legislation could incite such
harassment. The Kentucky Legislature, for instance, made the
enforcement of a Freedmen’s Court judgment a felony,123 and the Circuit
117. FONER, supra note 26, at 201.
118. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 287.
119. See Oakes, supra note 79, at 71.
120. REP. OF JOINT COMM. OF RECONSTRUCTION, at XVII–XVIII (Apr. 30,
1866); David Achtenberg, With Malice Toward Some: United States v. Kirby,
Malicious Prosecution, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 273,
301 (1995).
121. REP. OF JOINT COMM. OF RECONSTRUCTION, at XVII–XVIII (Apr. 30, 1866).
122. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 422 (quotation omitted).
123. Achtenberg, supra note 120, at 301 n.209 (citing An Act to Amend the
Criminal Law, ch. 766, § 2, 1865 Ky. Acts 60 (Feb. 17, 1866)). One of the
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Court in Paducah, McCracken County, Kentucky declared the Bureau
unconstitutional.124
David Achtenberg has documented the legal harassment of Bureau
agents in Kentucky.125 In addition to the cases mentioned above, the
Harrison County Circuit Court held the Freedmen’s Bureau illegal and the
acts of its agents tortious, while the Bourbon County Court declared the
Freedmen’s Bureau Act inapplicable to Kentucky and all its actions
void.126 While Bureau agent John Graham was travelling through rural
Kentucky to investigate reports of outrages that armed groups of White
“Regulators” committed, an innkeeper told Graham that had he known
Graham was with the Bureau, the inn would have denied him lodging at
any price.127 He also advised Graham to conceal his identity as a matter of
life and death.128
Early in 1866, General Ulysses S. Grant, General in Chief of the
Army, took a severe view of such vexatious action; on January 12, 1866,
he issued General Orders No. 3, entitled, “To protect loyal persons against
improper civil suits and penalties in late rebellious states.”129 The order’s
protections extended to officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army, which
would have included most Bureau agents; “and all persons thereto
attached, or in any wise thereto belonging, subject to military authority,”
which would have included the rest; to “loyal citizens or persons” charged
with offenses against rebel forces during the war; and persons charged
with occupying abandoned lands or plantations pursuant to governmental
order.130 Although the title of the order referred only to “improper civil
suits and penalties,” its text clearly included the criminal sphere, with its
directive to “issue and enforce orders protecting from prosecution or suits
. . . and . . . from any penalties or damages that may have been or may be
pronounced or adjudged” the categories of persons specified.131
The final clause of Grant’s order may have been of even greater import
to the Bureau’s judicial work: “protecting colored persons from
arguments wielded by the Bureau’s enemies in Kentucky was that, because that
state did not secede, the Bureau had no lawful jurisdiction there. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 304–05.
128. Id.
129. Gen. Grant, General Orders No. 3 (Jan. 12, 1866), in 16 PAPERS OF ULYSSES
S. GRANT 7–8 (John Y. Simon ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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prosecutions in any of said States charged with offenses for which white
persons are not prosecuted or punished in the same manner or degree.”132
This final clause would mean African-Americans would be militarily
protected from prosecutions to which Whites were not subject, or to
discriminatorily harsh punishments for offenses for which Whites were
subject to prosecution. Thus, Grant attempted to place firm ground under
the Bureau’s jurisdiction, where the operation of state criminal courts fell
unequally heavily on African-Americans.
As strong of a position as Grant took in General Orders No. 3, legal
harassment was not the only threat hanging over Bureau personnel and
pro-Union Whites in the South generally; the harassment could also take
the form of outright violence. Even under Union Army occupation, proUnion White Southerners had to keep a low profile. For example, a
Memphis cotton-mill owner sympathetic to the Union told a
Congressional committee that he “would no more think of raising a United
States flag on [his] mill than [he] would of putting a match” to it; to fly the
stars and stripes over the property would invite its certain destruction.133
One particularly shocking case was the murder of Lieutenant J.B.
Blanding, the Bureau agent in Grenada, Mississippi, when “a man stepped
out from an alley, and fired upon him three times” in April 1866.134 Before
his death, Blanding gave a detailed description of the perpetrator, however,
no suspect was ever apprehended.135 In fact, Howard heard reports of a
“brutal outrage” committed against “a citizen who denounced the
murder.”136
Brevet Major General T.J. Wood, commanding officer for
Mississippi, noted the abundance of “lawless men” around Grenada,
leaving the citizens vulnerable to “outrage,” and reported his unsuccessful
hunt for “the assassin of Lieutenant J.B. Blanding, . . . foully murdered
while on duty in the [Freedmen’s] Bureau.”137 Most unsettling was the
implication of the local population in helping the killer elude capture.
Despite the efforts of military forces and detectives, and even the
governor’s cooperation, the Secretary of War noted:

132. Id. at 7–9.
133. REPORT ON MEMPHIS RIOTS & MASSACRES, H.R. Rep. No. 101, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 244 (1866).
134. O.O. Howard to U.S. Grant (July 3, 1866), in 16 PAPERS OF GRANT, supra
note 129, at 228–29.
135. Id. at 229.
136. Id.
137. ANNUAL REP. OF SEC’Y OF WAR 53 (1866).
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[I]t has been impossible to arrest the murderer. Who he is is very
well known, but it is not known whether he is skulking in the
trackless swamps of this State, or has fled to some other. The
facility with which this information could be communicated to
him by his confederates in crime has so far rendered abortive all
the efforts for his arrest.138
Another egregious case was that of Captain C.C. Richardson, formerly
the Bureau agent in Thomasville, Georgia.139 Richardson fined a man
named Lightfoot “for his unmercifully beating a freedman in his
employ.”140 Lightfoot, outraged at the fine, proceeded to shoot
Richardson, wounding him.141 In later years, Howard recalled the broad
wave of violence against Bureau and military officers, and Blanding’s case
in particular:
The deliberate murder . . . of a worthy officer, . . . and attempts
upon the lives of other men who had been faithful and fearless in
the discharge of their delicate and dangerous duties, gave rise to
increased anxiety everywhere and seemed to necessitate an
increase of military force.142
The Bureau thus found itself dealing with hostile local surroundings,
thin resources, and an unsympathetic Executive, to say the least. Over
time, the latter factor would only intensify.
B. Battle over the Second Bureau Act
Lyman Trumbull, a relatively conservative Republican Senator from
Illinois, authored the first iteration of the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act,
S. 60 (“Second Bureau Act (I)”), and its companion legislation, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, S. 61. President Johnson would veto the Second
Bureau Act (I), as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress, however,
would fall just short of overriding the veto of the Second Bureau Act (I).
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Second Bureau Act (I) is
138. Id.
139. Gen. O.O. Howard to Gen. U.S. Grant (July 3, 1866), in 16 PAPERS OF
GRANT, supra note 129, at 228–29.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 289. See also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra
note 15, at 424–25. (“If [Army and Bureau] officials were not protected[,] their
capacity to protect [freedpeople] was severely qualified.”).
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remarkable and worth examining for its radicalism and its application of
lessons gleaned from the First Bureau Act. Moreover, the presidential veto
of the Second Bureau Act (I) had important political consequences
relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the Second Bureau Act (I) replaced the war’s-end-plus-one-year
time limit on the First Bureau Act with an indefinite extension of the
Bureau’s operation.143 The new bill also provided express authority for
judicial matters, a topic unmentioned in the First Bureau Act, with
Sections 7 and 8.144 The language establishing the Bureau’s jurisdiction
was remarkably broad, especially compared to Grant’s Circular No. 5,
which had asserted jurisdiction only “where there is an interruption of civil
law” or the local courts refused to accept African-Americans’
testimony.145 The new bill’s jurisdictional provision specified:
[W]henever in any State or district in which the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and
wherein, in consequence of any State or local law, ordinance,
police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice, any of the civil
rights or immunities belonging to white persons . . . are refused or
denied to freedmen . . . , or wherein they or any of them are
subjected to any other or different punishment, pains, or penalties,
for the commission of any act or offence, than are prescribed for
white persons committing like acts or offences, it shall be the duty
of the President of the United States, through the Commissioner,
to extend military protection and jurisdiction over all cases
affecting such persons so discriminated against.146
The bill went on to enumerate the “civil rights and immunities,” the
denial of which would give rise to jurisdiction:
[T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and estate, including
143. Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, § 1 (1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 94.
144. Id.
145. Freedmen’s Bureau, Circular No. 5, § VII, in REP. OF COMM’R OF
BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1865).
146. Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, § 6 (1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 94 (emphasis added).
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the constitutional right of bearing arms.147
The list thus included, but went far beyond, the right to give testimony and
the issue of jurisdiction under the First Bureau Act. In addition, the list
was identical to the one set forth in the Civil Rights Act.148
Of particular note is that the second clause of Section 7 expressed the
denial of “civil rights or immunities” as being “in consequence of any State
or local law, ordinance, police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice.”149
Circular No. 5, in contrast, simply referred to “interruption of civil law” or
places where “local courts, by reason of old codes, . . . disregard the negro’s
right to justice . . . in not allowing him to give testimony.”150 It is true that
the Second Bureau Act (I) placed the “[interruption] of judicial proceedings
. . . by the rebellion” and the “[refusal or denial] of any of the civil rights or
immunities belonging to white persons” in the conjunctive, whereas
Circular No. 5 placed its two pertinent phrases in the disjunctive.151
Nevertheless, the “custom or prejudice” language potentially effected a
broadening of jurisdiction, arguably giving the Bureau cognizance of
unequal application of state enforcement, rather than only of formally
discriminatory statutes.
Furthermore, Section 8 of the Second Bureau Act (I) provided for an
important enforcement power:
[A]ny person who, under color of any State or local law,
ordinance, police, or other regulation or custom, shall, in any State
or district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has
been interrupted by the rebellion, subject, or cause to be subjected,
any negro, mulatto, freedman, refugee, or other person, on account
of race or color, or any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, or for any other cause, to the deprivation of
any civil right secured to white persons, or to any other or different
punishment than white persons are subject to for the commission
of like acts or offences, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or

147. Id.
148. Civil Rights Act (1866), reprinted in THE AMERICAN NATION, supra note
44, at 99–101.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Freedmen’s Bureau, Circular No. 5, § VII, in REP. OF COMM’R OF
BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1865).
151. Id.
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imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both . . . .152
The section went on to impose a duty on Bureau personnel “to take
jurisdiction of” and try “all offences committed against . . . this section,
and also of all cases affecting negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, refugees, or
other persons who are discriminated against in any of the particulars
mentioned in the preceding section of this act.”153 The contrast between
the breadth and explicit nature of this jurisdictional grant with the
vagueness of the First Bureau Act154 could not have been more striking.
One of the more disputed provisions in the Second Bureau Act (I) was
its assertion of military jurisdiction over Bureau agents.155 The actual
jurisdictional expansion this provision entailed was minor, because most
Bureau agents were Army officers, already subject to military
jurisdiction.156
The Second Bureau Act (I) was twinned with the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Senator Trumbull authored both of these “sibling legislative
actions,”157 and Congress reported them out of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction simultaneously.158 The author conceptualized them jointly,
and their sponsors saw them as complementing one another.159 Legal
scholar James W. Fox, Jr. characterized the relationship between the two
bills this way: “While the Civil Rights Act declared and protected
citizenship, the Freedmen’s Bureau developed citizenship.”160 In addition,
the Second Bureau Act (I) applied to the former Confederate states, while
the Civil Rights Act was national in scope.

152. Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, § 8 (1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 94.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
155. Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, § 2 (1865), reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 93.
156. Bickers, supra note 11, at 93.
157. James W. Fox, Jr., Democratic Citizenship & Congressional
Reconstruction: Defining & Implementing the Privileges & Immunities of
Citizenship, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 453, 466 (2004).
158. MCFEELY, supra note 11, at 232.
159. See id.; see also NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 109–11.
160. Fox, Jr., supra note 157, at 467. Mark Graber has argued that the Second
Bureau Act (I) sought to develop citizenship by providing freedpeople with the
goods—primarily land—and services—primarily education—necessary to enable
their transition to effective citizenship. Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1362–63, 1367 (2016).
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The bills were also interwoven in their enforcement mechanisms. The
Civil Rights Act made the Bureau part of the Act’s enforcement
mechanism:
[T]he district attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals of the
United States, . . . [and] the officers and agents of the Freedmen’s
Bureau, . . . are hereby, specially authorized and required . . . to
institute proceedings against all and every person who shall
violate the provisions of this act, and cause him or them to be
arrested and imprisoned, or bailed [for trial in such federal court]
as by this act has cognizance of the offence.161
The Civil Rights Act also specified the right to remove to federal court
any civil suit or criminal prosecution charging any person for “any arrest
or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or
under color of authority derived from this act or the act establishing a
Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees, and all acts amendatory
thereof.”162 The “amendatory thereof” language clearly contemplated the
Second Bureau Act (I), which Trumbull also drafted and presented
simultaneously to the Senate. Thus, legislation would impose on the
Bureau a federal statutory duty to apprehend and prosecute violators of
both the Civil Rights Act—“this act” under Section 4—and of the
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, so specified in Section 3.163
The Freedmen’s Bureau, then, was not an isolated entity but part of a
larger statutory scheme. In United States v. Rhodes, an 1866 case
concerning the Civil Rights Act, Justice Swayne spoke of a complex
“machinery” of which the Bureau was a key component.164 Writing for the
court, Swayne reviewed the Civil Rights Act section by section, noting the
assignment of Freedmen’s Bureau agents, along with district attorneys,
marshals, and other officers, of the duty to institute proceedings against
persons violating the Act, and declared: “It is incredible that all this
machinery, including the agency of the [F]reedmen’s [B]ureau, would
have been provided, if the intention were to limit the criminal jurisdiction
conferred by the third section to colored persons, and exclude all white
persons from its operation.”165 Just as the Second Bureau Act (I)
161. Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1866), § 4, reprinted in THE AMERICAN
NATION, supra note 44, at 99–100 (emphasis added).
162. Id. § 3, reprinted in THE AMERICAN NATION, supra note 44, at 99
(emphasis added).
163. Id. §§ 3–4, reprinted in THE AMERICAN NATION, supra note 44, at 99–100.
164. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (Cir. Ct., D. Ky. 1866).
165. Id. at 787.
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contemplated a far greater enforcement power in the Bureau’s hands,
making it more effectively part of the vast “machinery” Justice Swayne
alluded to, the agency earned the implacable enmity of the President and
his allies.
C. Johnson’s Veto
On February 19, 1866, President Johnson vetoed the Second Bureau
Act (I).166 The message accompanying Johnson’s veto was long, closely if
at times contradictorily argued, and fierce in its denunciations of the
legislation.167 Johnson objected to the Bureau’s “greatly enlarged powers”
under the bill, railing against the necessity of the bill when the First Bureau
Act “ha[d] not yet expired,” the expense it would incur, and the vast field
it would open for patronage and corruption.168 Johnson also questioned the
constitutionality of the measure when the states affected were
unrepresented in Congress.169
But the President’s heaviest fire was directed at the judicial provisions,
which he asserted meant “a system of military jurisdiction” that he
“c[ould] not reconcile . . . with the words of the Constitution.”170 Johnson
went on to quote the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Speedy Trial and Jury Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.171 Johnson denied
the need for military or Bureau tribunals because “[a]t present there is no
part of our country in which the authority of the United States is
disputed”—and because it would “disturb the commerce and credit and
industry of the country” to “declar[e] to the American people and to the

166. Johnson, supra note 2.
167. Id. The tension, excitement, and strong feelings surrounding the message
are well described by historian Claude G. Bowers. BOWERS, supra note 7, at 102.
One can sense the high pitch of feeling surrounding the Second Bureau Act (I) in
Kentucky Democrat Garret Davis’s sardonic proposal: following Senate passage
of the bill, Davis proposed that it be renamed, in part,
[a] bill . . . to promote strife and conflict between the white and black
races; and to invest the Freedmen’s Bureau with unconstitutional powers
to aid and assist the blacks, and to introduce military power to prevent
the Commissioner and other officers of said bureau from being restrained
or held responsible in civil courts for their illegal acts.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1866).
168. Johnson, supra note 2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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world that the United States are still in a condition of civil war.”172 Johnson
also quoted “by local law, custom, or prejudice” from the jurisdictional
language in Section 7.173 Although he did so without specific comment,
the context for the quotation was language inveighing against the “great[]
enlarge[ment]” of Bureau powers.174
The President scathingly denounced the procedural aspects of Bureau
and military adjudication.175 He decried the lack of a jury or “any fixed
rules of law or evidence” in “trials having their origin under this bill,”
which he termed “arbitrary tribunals” from which there “l[ay] no
appeal.”176 Overall, Johnson’s message amounted to a complete
repudiation of the Bureau.177
Johnson’s veto stunned Republicans in Congress, who had not
expected such a response.178 White Southerners and Democrats generally
greeted the response with enthusiasm.179 The subsequent Senate vote fell
two votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to override the veto.180
Possibly radicalized by the substance and manner of the President’s veto
of the Second Bureau Act (I), however, in early April, Congress overrode
Johnson’s later veto of the Civil Rights Act and enacted the Bureau’s
companion bill into law—marking the first “enact[ment] [of] a major piece
of legislation over a President’s veto.”181
The presidential veto of the Second Bureau Act (I) was a political
watershed, “precipitat[ing] the final and irreparable break between the
President and the Republican Congress.”182 Republican politicians and
press witheringly denounced Johnson, and the President responded with
his “swing around the circle,” a defiant and ill-starred whistle-stop tour of
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. FONER, supra note 26, at 247.
178. Id.
179. Bowers describes “a great crowd ma[king] merry at Cooper Union in
New York, where Seward and Raymond spoke aggressively in defense of
Johnson’s policies.” BOWERS, supra note 7, at 103; see also Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action & the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REV. 753, 786 (1985).
180. FONER, supra note 26, at 247.
181. Id. at 251.
182. Schnapper, supra note 179, at 771; Hans Trefousse, Andrew Johnson &
the Freedmen’s Bureau, in THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU & RECONSTRUCTION:
RECONSIDERATIONS 15 (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds., 1999).
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multiple cities whose low point featured the President’s denunciation of
Radical Republican leaders as traitors every bit as ignominious as the
secessionists.183 The veto marked a “before and after” moment, setting the
stage for the overthrow of the President’s “Restoration” policy by
Congressional Reconstruction.184
As 1866 wore on, Freedmen’s Bureau officials found themselves the
frequent targets of prosecution for attempting to enforce the 1866 Civil
Rights Act.185 This was ironic in view of the Act’s express object of
protecting Bureau and other officials from such prosecution, by enabling
removal to federal courts. Section 3 of the Act provided, in relevant part:
[I]f any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been or shall be
commenced in any State court . . . against any officer . . . or other
person, for any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or wrongs done
or committed by virtue or under color of authority derived from
this act . . . such defendant shall have the right to remove such
cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court.186
D. War, Peace, and Milligan
On April 2, 1866, Johnson issued a proclamation187 declaring that a
state of insurrection no longer existed in 10 of the 11 states of the former
Confederacy—Texas being the lone exception. “There now exist[ed],” the
President declared, “no organized armed resistance of misguided citizens
or others to the authority of the United States” in those states, “and the
laws can be sustained and enforced therein by the proper civil authority,
State or Federal.”188 What that meant for the continued exercise of federal
power in the South remained a puzzle. Although the President declared
that “standing armies, military occupation, martial law, military tribunals,
and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus” were inconsistent with a
183. Id. Apparently provoked bv a heckler’s shout of “Hang Jeff Davis,”
Johnson asked—presumably rhetorically—“Why not hang Thad Stevens and
Wendell Phillips?” See MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 517; see also RIDDLEBERGER,
supra note 13, at 219.
184. See FONER, supra note 26, at 247.
185. Achtenberg, supra note 120, at 301.
186. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 4.
187. President Johnson, Proclamation No. 153, Declaring the Insurrection in
Certain Southern States to be at an End (Apr. 2, 1866), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71987 [https://perma.cc/4RCV-NPU8]
(last visited July 11, 2018).
188. Id.
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state of peace, he did not at first explicitly end such measures.189 Moreover,
it was not clear how the proclamation bore on the Freedmen’s Bureau in
light of the Texas exception. The proclamation, which the President did
not issue until late afternoon, apparently came as a surprise to Johnson’s
cabinet.190
On the very next day, in what historian Brooks D. Simpson sees as
very likely not mere happenstance, the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Ex parte Milligan, although it did not release the full opinion
until the year’s end.191 The Court announced in Milligan that the military
commission in question had no jurisdiction over the civilian defendant
because of the availability of civil courts at the relevant time.192
Contemporaries widely saw the case as directly implicating federal
policies on the administration of justice in the South, although Justice
Davis, who wrote for the Court in Milligan, famously remarked that “[n]ot
a word [was] said in the opinion about [R]econstruction & the power is
conceded in insurrectionary States.”193
Certainly Johnson saw Milligan as applying in the former Confederate
states; he expressly cited the decision in December 1866 when he ordered
the Bureau to cede jurisdiction in the notorious Virginia case of Dr. James
L. Watson.194 Enforcement officials accused Watson of the cold-blooded
murder of an African-American in November, apparently because he took
offense to the African-American’s attempt to pass Watson’s carriage.195
An examining court composed of five county magistrates discharged
Watson, but General John M. Schofield, Virginia’s Bureau assistant
commissioner, invoking the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, ordered
Watson’s arrest, to be bound over for military trial—even disregarding a
habeas corpus writ from the Richmond Circuit Court.196 When Milligan
became public, the Richmond Dispatch jubilantly proclaimed that the
decision had left “not one inch of ground upon which the commission can
base a claim of jurisdiction.”197 Johnson, through Virginia State Attorney
189. Simpson, supra note 77, at 15.
190. Id.
191. Id.; NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 146.
192. Simpson, supra note 77, at 15.
193. Id. at 21–22. It should be noted that Justice Davis made the comment in
personal correspondence at a later date. Id.
194. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 163.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Act invoked by Schofield was the one enacted into law over the
president’s veto in July 1866. See infra Part III.E.
197. Bickers, supra note 11, at 93.
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General Stanbery, ordered Watson’s release on the ground that Milligan
precluded a military trial.198
But Howard was circumspect about whether Milligan truly precluded
the Bureau from taking cognizance of a case like Watson’s, for two
reasons. First, because Milligan ruled out “military trials of civilians where
civil courts were open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction”; and second, because Milligan was a case which took place
in Indiana, and therefore the case might not have been applicable to former
Confederate territory.199 Stanbery, on the other hand, interpreted Milligan
to imply that:
[A] Reconstruction commander had only a power “to sustain the
existing frame of social order and civil rule, and not a power to
introduce military rule in its place. In effect, it is a police power
to be used only when the state failed to perform.” And the
President, not the on-the-scene commander, would decide if state
nonperformance existed.200
Johnson’s maneuvering to undercut Bureau jurisdiction, in the
meantime, proceeded apace. On May 1, 1866, the President directed
Secretary of War Stanton to issue General Orders No. 26, which stated that
from that point forward, where civil courts were functioning, civilians
would no longer be “brought before military courts-martial or
commissions” but rather “committed to the proper civil authorities.”201 In
placing so minimal a condition for the exercise of state-court
jurisdiction—after all, the requirement merely that “civil tribunals [be] in
existence which can try them,”202 without more, was easily satisfied—
Johnson left even the issue of African-American testimony out of the
equation, to say nothing of more egregious violations of equal justice.203
On the very day that Stanton issued his General Orders No. 26,
Memphis erupted into what would become a three-day rampage of murder
and other crimes against freedmen, an irony that would be difficult to
198. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 167.
199. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). Justice Davis’s clear, if later, disavowal of
the applicability of Milligan to the former Confederate states furnishes at least
some ground for supporting Grant’s reading of the situation. See Simpson, supra
note 77, at 21–22.
200. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 446 (quoting OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, XII, 182).
201. Simpson, supra note 77, at 16; ASH, supra note 71.
202. Simpson, supra note 77, at 16.
203. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 115–21.
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miss.204 One historian said, with considerable understatement, that to
“deem civil authorities ready to dispense justice to blacks when many of
[those authorities] participated” in such egregious acts of violence as the
Memphis Massacre “transcended rational thought.”205
Grant did not understand General Orders No. 26 to undercut the
jurisdiction of military commissions to protect African-Americans from
the enforcement of discriminatory state laws, but he was concerned that it
blocked the use of such commissions to prosecute serious crimes
committed against African-Americans.206
Meanwhile, field agents continued to report unpunished outrages to
Bureau leadership. In response, Grant issued a landmark directive: his
General Orders No. 44, of July 6, 1866, directing commanders in the
former Confederacy to arrest persons charged with crimes against officials
as well as “citizens and inhabitants . . . , irrespective of color, in cases
where the civil authorities have failed, neglected, or are unable to arrest
and bring such parties to trial; and to detain them in military confinement
until such time as a proper judicial tribunal may be ready and willing to
try them.”207
The rear-guard nature of Grant’s order, pushing against the tide of
presidential efforts to rein in the Bureau, was evident. Falling short of a
reassertion of military or Bureau jurisdiction, the measure implied a
provisional and remedial response to the failings of state courts.208 Despite
its qualified and contingent language, Grant’s order represented an
unmistakable statement of the continued limitations of state systems of
justice for the freedmen.209
Shortly thereafter, on July 30, 1866, a massacre erupted in New
Orleans, just as horrific as the violent explosion in Memphis two months
earlier; once more, the acts of both commission and omission implicated
204. Simpson, supra note 77, at 16–18.
205. Id. at 16.
206. Id. at 17.
207. Gen. Grant, General Orders No. 44 (July 6, 1866), in 16 PAPERS OF
GRANT, supra note 129, at 228.
208. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 141–43. In some instances, Bureau
officials used Grant’s order aggressively, as with the arrest in South Carolina of a
county sheriff and jailer following a jail fire in which the lone white inmate was
released and the two dozen African-American inmates were left trapped to die in
the blaze. Id. at 141. More common was the modest, but still palpable, use of the
order to “prod state law-enforcement officials to proceed against persons who had
committed crimes against freedmen.” Id.
209. See id. at 141–43.
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civil authorities in the outrages.210 Just three weeks later, on August 20,
1866, Johnson further extended his “peace offensive” by Proclamation No.
157, declaring that the state of insurrection in Texas was at an end, and
therefore “peace, order, tranquility, and civil authority now exist[ed] in
and throughout the whole of the United States of America.”211
The President’s hostility to the Bureau—the “positive opposition”
which Grant had observed as early as the end of 1865212—helped make it
a permanently embattled agency.213 Not only did the President
“transform[] his vetoes and other messages into public lectures on the evils
of the very national policies that Congress had charged him to enforce,”214
but measures such as his peace proclamations sowed uncertainty in Bureau
and Army personnel as to their scope of authority on judicial matters.215
On the day of Johnson’s second proclamation, for instance, a general in
Florida asked whether the measure “deprived [the general] of the exercise
of command” and of “martial law” where authority via federal statute and
military orders came into conflict with the state government’s statute and
action.216
As the President’s measures shook the self-assuredness of Bureau
leadership and agents, the measures also helped undermine the legitimacy
of Freedmen’s Courts and related tribunals by striking at the heart of a
court’s authority—its jurisdiction.217 Presidential blocking of the Bureau’s
judicial functions operated in tandem with the ongoing, low-level violence
210. ASH, supra note 71, at 185–86; MCPHERSON, supra note 3, at 516.
211. President Johnson, Proclamation No. 157, Declaring that Peace, Order,
Tranquillity [sic], and Civil Authority Now Exists [sic] in and Throughout the
Whole of the United States of America (Aug. 20, 1866), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71992 [https://perma.cc/T6HP-ARG4],
(last visited July 11, 2018).
212. HOWARD, supra note 31, at II, 280.
213. For analogous instances from recent history of federal agencies under
siege from hostile Executive or Congressional forces, see William Boyd,
Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s-1970s, 39 ECOLOGY L. Q. 895,
967, 980 (2012) (on changing political climate hostile to regulation generally and
the EPA in particular); Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment
vs. Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN.
L. REV. 713, 749 (1997) (on political expressions conveying “intense employer
antipathy” to OSHA).
214. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 421.
215. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 115–21.
216. Id.
217. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2011).
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in many parts of the South. While the Bureau had a statutory foundation,
it “had to rely on the Army for support if the courts proved to be
inadequate,” as they frequently did—“and the bluecoats were themselves
insecure.”218 In attempting to carry out its judicial duties, then, the Bureau
was like an army forced to fight a two-front war.
E. Second Version of the Act
Congress’s second attempt at a Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act
(“Second Bureau Act (II)”) unfolded during May and June. The House and
Senate reconciled their versions and Congress passed the bill on July 3,
1866.219 The bill had key differences from the original vetoed by Johnson,
including a two-year, rather than indefinite, extension of the Bureau’s life,
and the omission of any reference to confirming freedmen’s title to lands
expropriated by Sherman’s Sea Islands field order.220
With respect to the Bureau’s judicial powers, too, the Second Bureau
Act (II) contained notable differences from the earlier version. Most
significantly, the broad language that included “custom or prejudice” as
among the causes of the denial of “civil rights or immunities” over which
the Bureau could take cognizance, was now gone.221 Instead, Section 14
of the Second Bureau Act (II) mandated Bureau jurisdiction:
[I]n every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and until the
same shall be fully restored, and in every State or district whose
constitutional relations to the Government have been practically
discontinued by the rebellion, and until such State shall have been
restored in such relations, and shall be duly represented in the
Congress of the United States . . . .222
The new version enumerated the same list of civil rights and immunities
as in the earlier version, and asserted jurisdiction where Congress imposed
unequal penalties or punishments “because of race or color, or previous
condition of slavery, other or greater than the penalty or punishment to
218. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 15, at 421.
219. HARPER’S WEEKLY, July 21, 1866.
220. Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, § 1 (July 3, 1866), reprinted in WILLIAM
H. BARNES, HISTORY OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1868).
221. Id. § 14.
222. Id.
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which white persons may be liable by law for the like offense.”223 Its
substantive provisions remained unchanged, but the jurisdictional assertion
was perhaps more limited. Congress also dispensed with Section 8 of the
Second Bureau Act (I), which mandated arrest and prosecution by the
Bureau for violations of Section 7 by any person acting “under color of any
State or local law”—an omission that amounted to a weakening of the Act’s
enforcement mechanism.224
The second version of this bill also proved unacceptable to Johnson.
He conveyed a shorter, but still adamant, veto message to Congress on
July 16, 1866, which in effect incorporated by reference his veto message
from the earlier bill.225 Johnson emphasized in vetoing the newer bill that
the only conceivable basis for such legislation was in the constitutional
war-making power:
Why should this war measure be continued beyond the period
designated in the original act, and why in time of peace should
military tribunals be created to continue until each “State shall be
fully restored in its constitutional relations to the Government and
shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States”?226
For Johnson, the questions were rhetorical; he did not entertain the
possibility that courts largely denied the freedmen justice in the Southern
states.227 On the same day Congress received the veto message, Congress
put the bill to a vote, and this time successfully overrode the veto.228 The
contentious path taken by the legislation yielded a more modest Second
Bureau Act (II), highlighting the many difficult political realities faced by
the Bureau in its judicial aspect. The battle over the Bureau’s future was also
a prelude to Congress’s outright takeover of Reconstruction policy in early
1867.229

223. Id.
224. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 143.
225. Johnson, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (July 16, 1866), http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=71982 [https://perma.cc/3GR2-V9VK].
226. Id. ¶ 2.
227. Trefousse, supra note 182, at 30–33.
228. NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 115.
229. See FONER, supra note 26, at 271–91.
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F. The Bureau as Experience
In addition to its direct exercise of judicial authority, the Bureau also
fulfilled informational functions, at times serving as a source of valuable
insight into the operation of justice in the postwar South.230 Where state
courts exercised jurisdiction over cases involving freedmen, Bureau agents
were to attend trials and report on the impartiality of the proceedings.231
Lieutenant George Cook, a Virginia Bureau agent, reported “as far as
notified I have attended criminal trials in which freedmen were concerned
in this [sub-district] during the last month.”232 He observed that “almost
without exception where white[] persons have been parties the decisions”
favored them; but where freedmen suffered assaults, “in not one instance
has any satisfaction been given the freedman[.] [I]t is only by the most
strenuous exertions that I can get Magistrates to hear the cases and the results
of trials are so unfavorable as to make it better in most instances not to try
the case.”233
Another Bureau agent reported on two trials for horse theft, both
resulting in convictions; a jury sentenced a white man to one year
imprisonment, “while in the other case another jury (of course) sentenced
the prisoner to five years.”234 Still another Bureau agent reported
despairingly of the chances for justice where African-Americans were
victims of crime: “I have never yet known of an instance where a Justice
of the Peace has recognized a white man to appear for indictment for an
offense, no matter how grave, committed against a colored person.
Complaints by the latter . . . are almost invariably slighted.”235

230. REP. OF COMM’R OF BRF&AL, H.R. Doc. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (Dec.
1, 1865). Howard reported to Congress that the Bureau was “a means of constant and
reliable information essential to congressional and executive action.” Id.
231. See NIEMAN, supra note 11, at 132–33.
232. Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of Virginia, supra note
72 at Lt. George V. Cook to Capt. R.S. Lacy (July 31, 1866), http://www.freedmens
bureau.com/virginia/crimcases2.htm [https://perma.cc/35T3-BCVJ] (last visited
July 11, 2018).
233. Id.
234. Id. at Lt. James Kestardin to Brig. Gen. O. Brown (May 31, 1866),
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/virginia/crimcases.htm
[https://perma.cc/R6M7-C8L4] (emphasis added).
235. Id. at Lt. W.T. DeKnight to Bvt. Maj. Gen. O. Brown (Oct. 31, 1866),
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/virginia/crimcases7.htm
[https://perma.cc/NUW3-FBQZ].
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Agents’ reports on proceedings in Southern civil courts were not
always so bleak. Captain John O. Dwyer noted that in Caroline County,
Virginia in September 1866, “there [were] but a few cases of Freedmen
tried in the courts of this Co[unty]. In those cases they were dealt with
more leniently than if they were white people, in[asmuch] as their
ignorance of the law was in some instances taken for an excuse.”236 An
agent in Virginia reported that a Franklin County judge included, along
with “the usual questions” at voir dire, the question: “will the fact of the
prisoner being a Negro have any influence over your mind to prevent your
dealing fairly and impartially with him?”237 The same Bureau agent who
reported approvingly on the Franklin County judge’s voir dire inquiry also
noted that each of four defendant freedmen charged with larceny “was well
defended by able Counsel [and] all were treated with impartiality [and]
fairness and the Law respecting their testimony was carried out ably”; two
of the four were acquitted.238
Sometimes an attorney noted the presence of a Bureau observer and
even made an issue in a proceeding. In another Virginia trial, the attorney
for a white man on whose complaint an African-American had been
arrested and charged with stealing cotton from the white man, and who
was assisting the prosecution, pointedly singled out the Bureau’s
representative.239 The attorney took great pains to note that “there was an
‘[e]missary’ of the Federal Government . . . present for the purpose of
reporting the proceedings,” and he averred to the jury that “‘the
Yankees[,]’ in breathing this ethereal bubble of freedom in the whole race
had but left them the happy alternative to either starve [and] go naked or
steal.”240 Therefore, counsel argued, the jury had “a solemn duty to make
[a] severe example[]” of the accused; otherwise, “robbery, arson, rape[,]
[and] murder would become the order of the day throughout the already
devastated [and] oppressed South.”241
236. Id. at Capt. John O. Dwyer to Maj. James Johnson (Sep. 30, 1866),
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/virginia/crimcases6.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RNJ-YAHV].
237. Id. at Lt. W.T. DeKnight to Bvt. Maj. Gen. O. Brown (Oct. 31, 1866),
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/virginia/crimcases7.htm
[https://perma.cc/NUW3-FBQZ].
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. Apparently stunned at the court’s allowing counsel to proffer such
highly prejudicial arguments, the Bureau agent characterized it as “very
unfortunate that a presiding Judge tacitly allows such language to find free
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Bureau policy also mandated the compilation of certain kinds of
information. For instance, Howard required that Bureau agents report
atrocities to him through the assistant commissioners, under the general
heading of “Outrages.”242 As the toll of violence continued through 1866,
Grant responded to a request from the Senate by asking Howard to “‘send
[Grant] a list of authenticated cases of Murder, and other violence, upon
Freedmen’ and Union men in the South.”243 The result, submitted in
February 1867, was the Bureau’s report on “violations of the Civil Rights
Bill,” documenting 400 “outrages committed on the freedmen” in 1866.244
Democrats, however, saw such compilations as purely political acts
by Radical Republicans: the pro-Redeemer historian Claude G. Bowers
mocked Massachusetts Senator “Henry Wilson, nervously running
through his scrapbook” in search of yet “another ‘Southern outrage.’”245
Gideon Welles discounted such reports as nothing more than “an omniumgatherum of newspaper gossip.”246 Nevertheless, some of the most
valuable insights into the operation of Southern state and local courts
comes from the observations of Bureau agents who were not exercising
jurisdiction but rather observing and interceding on the freedmen’s behalf
in those courts.247

expression before him in his judicial capacity in a public Court of Justice,” and
that an officer of the federal government “present in the proper discharge of his
incumbent duty ha[d] not the right to claim protection from or resent the indignity
offered him personally or the Government through him as its (not secret) agent or
otherwise.” Id.
242. MCFEELY, supra note 11, at 200–01; see also Freedmen’s Bureau
Records Relating to Murders and Outrages, FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ONLINE,
http://www.freedmensbureau.com/outrages.htm [https://perma.cc/X3LU-U45A]
(last visited July 11, 2018).
243. RONALD C. WHITE, AMERICAN ULYSSES: A LIFE OF ULYSSES S. GRANT
439 (Random House 2016).
244. Id. Grant’s belief, likely shared by Howard, was that the report would
strengthen the hand of the Congressional Republicans in imposing their vision of
Reconstruction. See id.
245. BOWERS, supra note 7, at 103 (quoting N.Y. WORLD, Feb. 24, 1866).
246. BENTLEY, supra note 11, at 165. Historian George Bentley, likewise
declining to credit a genuine need for Bureau jurisdiction but rather ascribing the
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The legislators who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment were
undoubtedly cognizant of the fine-grained experience of Southern justice
the Freedmen’s Bureau obtained.248 The Joint Committee on
Reconstruction realized the vulnerability not only of the freedpeople, but
of the Army, and therefore the Bureau, in its report forwarding the draft
amendment to Congress—underscoring the “bitter[] hat[red] and
relentless[] persecut[ion]” of Union Army officers, including prosecutions
in state courts.249
IV. THE BUREAU AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Bureau was tightly interwoven with the Civil Rights Act as part of
the enforcement machinery for the latter.250 As such, the Bureau was a
central part of Congress’s first attempt to place a statutory foundation under
national citizenship, carrying rights the states were bound to respect. This
concept lay at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, the text of which
opens with a forthright statement of birthright—and naturalization—
citizenship “of the United States and of the state wherein [persons] reside”
and a prohibition on any state legislation or enforcement abridging,
depriving, or denying any person of the rights of United States citizens.251
It is also uncontroversial that the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in
the citizenship section, had as a key purpose the constitutional
reinforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.252 A similar logic plausibly
applies to the Bureau, in part because it was so closely intertwined with
the Civil Rights Act, and in part because Johnson’s veto attacked the
Second Bureau Act (I)’s constitutionality. At the time of Johnson’s veto
of the latter bill, Congress was debating an early draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the idea of “giving Congress enforcement
authority similar to that now contained in section 5.”253
During the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont addressed the question of whether
statutory solutions were adequate to meet the challenges of according the
freedmen full citizenship.254 Representative Woodbridge asked whether
the “duty of the American people” towards the freedmen was satisfied by
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See, e.g., supra notes 230–47 and accompanying text.
Rep. of Joint Comm. of Reconstruction, at xvii–xviii (Apr. 30, 1866).
Supra notes 157–65 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Graber, supra note 160, at 1395; see also Schnapper, supra note 179, at 785.
Schnapper, supra note 179, at 785.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (Feb. 28, 1866).
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“merely knock[ing] the shackles from their limbs” and leaving them
nominally free but hungry, “without the power of attaining of those civil
natural rights which make freedom not only a name but a power.”255
Woodbridge went on:
[I]t may be said that all this may be done by legislation. I am rather
inclined to think that the most of it may be so accomplished. But
the experience of this Congress in that regard has been most
unfortunate. Sir, I cast no imputation upon the President of the
United States. I believe him to be honest, able, and patriotic. And
I pray to God that the sea of discord may become quiet . . . . But
inasmuch as the President, honestly, I have no doubt, has told us
that there were constitutional difficulties in the way, I simply
suggest that we submit the proposition to the people, that they may
remove these objections by amending the instrument itself.256
Woodbridge concluded by enunciating the Fourteenth Amendment’s
object as giving Congress “the power . . . to enact those laws which will
give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which necessarily
pertain to citizenship[,] . . . in whatever state he may be.”257 These were
the central concerns of both the Second Bureau Act (I) and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.
Woodbridge stressed the idea of placing legislation designed to affirm
and bolster the freedmen’s citizenship beyond the vagaries to which
statutory law is subject, “by amending the instrument [the Constitution]
itself.”258 The Republican majority in Congress, however, was also facing
a tenacious and—at least by many—unexpected presidential effort to
“obstruct[] the execution of laws.”259 A constitutional amendment would
arguably put such legislation beyond the reach of an adversarial Executive.
What raises this possibility above mere speculation is that it was precisely
Johnson’s veto of the Second Bureau Act (I) that hardened the battle-lines
between Johnson and the Congressional Republicans.260
The Bureau’s experience in the judicial realm also furnished
information vital to Congress concerning discriminatory state laws,
unequal enforcement of nominally nondiscriminatory laws, and perhaps
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
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worst of all, state law enforcement and state courts’ non-prosecution of
violent “outrages.”261 Though armed with guns and ostensibly shielded by
the law, the Bureau shared in the vulnerability of the freedpeople at the
end of a bitter Civil War that, presidential proclamations notwithstanding,
arguably had not ended in 1865 and would not end for many years.262 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of securing a national citizenship, bringing
with it rights inviolable by the states, was one that the difficult experience
of the Bureau helped inform.
V. POSTSCRIPT
The Freedmen’s Bureau courts represented a historic experiment—an
attempt to establish a regime to administer justice to a disenfranchised and
despised group of people during a hostile period in history, when the larger
White Southern society believed them to be undeserving of freedom, human
dignity, respect, and certainly equality. For a culture that extolled the virtue
and propagated the narrative of white supremacy, according recently freed
African-Americans the ability to testify in courts against Whites, or even
exercise de minimis accoutrements of the qualities of citizenship,
represented a threat to the social order White Southerners sought to restore
and defend. The Southern civil courts, steeped in Southern cultural norms,
accorded white supremacy priority over the rule of law. That overarching
hegemony posed an existential threat to the independence of the Bureau
courts. Regional cultural norms, combined with hostility from the federal
Executive Branch as well as fractional support from Congress, amounted
to a formula for anemic results, which left African-Americans vulnerable
and exposed.
The experience of the Freedmen’s Bureau courts exemplifies the
challenge courts face to ensure justice in both peaceful and tumultuous
times. Courts must assure unpopular causes, oppressed people, and racial
and cultural minorities that during times of war and of peace, periods of
protest and calm, and times of strong leaders who may be hostile to their
rights, civilians can count on the courts to ensure justice and to protect the
rule of law, without fear or favor. The actions of courts must withstand
harsh scrutiny, in both the glaring light of the present and the cool light of
hindsight. Today, African-Americans have the highest distrust in courts to

261. See supra Parts II.B, III.F.
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deliver just and fair outcomes.263 Numerous studies have shown that
unconscious negative stereotypes and racial bias still pervade our justice
system at every level.264 Studying the functioning of Freedmen’s Bureau
courts in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War provides an important
foundation for further examination of where the country stands as a
racially and ethnically diverse society 150 years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the 21st century, no less than amidst the ruins
of this country’s great fratricidal conflict, courts must stand strong as a
beacon of justice and equality for all.
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